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A system of tradable permits in the standard setting is effective in attaining the policy 
objective with regard to pollution reduction at the least cost. This outcome is challenged in 
case of a tradable permit system in a federal state with individual states having discretionary 
power regarding environmental policy and where pollution is transboundary across states. 
This paper explores the opportunities of the central authority to influence the effectiveness of 
the system, under different institutional arrangements, through the initial allocation of 
permits. 
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A  tradable  emissions  permit  (TEP)  system  is  typically  associated  with  the  twin  aim  of 
attaining the centrally set economy-wide level of emissions, and achieving cost efficiency. All 
the  (federal)  government  has  to  do,  is  to  determine  the  desired  pollution  level,  and  to 
distribute the total number of permits associated with this optimal pollution level among those 
firms, that emit a pollutant in the production process. The profit-maximizing firms have the 
possibility to reduce emissions by means of an abatement technology or by buying permits 
instead. Given the initial allocation of permits to the firms, in a competitive equilibrium the 
market price for permits equals marginal abatement costs, which are therefore equal across 
firms implying that total abatement costs are minimised. Furthermore all permits will be used 
in  equilibrium,  implying  that  the  goal  with  respect  to  pollution  is  exactly  met.  The  two 
objectives of minimal abatement cost and attaining the desired level of pollution are achieved 
whatever the initial allocation of permits. Allocating permits is, therefore, in the standard TEP 
systems inessential to reaching the objectives.  
However, in order for these attractive properties to hold several conditions need to be 
satisfied. The main problem arising within this setting is the violation of the assumption of 
competitiveness. A useful distinction is between imperfect competition on the product market 
on  the  one  hand  and  imperfect  competition  on  the  permits  market  on  the  other  hand. 
Sartzetakis (2004) makes the most recent contribution and also provides a nice overview of 
the  work  done  on  imperfect  product  markets,  reviewing  among  others  Malueg  (1990), 
Sartzetakis (1997a) and Long and Soubeyran (2000). The central message from this literature 
is that perfect competition on the permits markets might not lead to efficiency if the product 
market is characterized by imperfect competition. Imperfect competition may lead to firms 
with high abatement costs becoming too aggressive on the permits market. Hahn (1984) and 
Kolstad (2000 pp. 167-170) show that with one firm having market power on the permits 
market,  efficiency  of  a  TEP  system  is  violated  in  a  world  where  firms  aim  at  cost 
minimization, unless the initial permit distribution is such that the allocation to the firm with 
market power coincides with its optimal use of permits. Misiolek and Elder (1989) consider 
the case where the firm that is dominant on the product market can by exerting ‘excessive’ 
demand for permits, also manipulate the permits market and thereby the cost of its rivals. 
Subsequent work in this area has been done by Von der Fehr (1993) and Sartzetakis (1997b). 
Fershtman and De Zeeuw (1996) consider the case of an oligopoly on the product market, and 
Nash bargaining on the permits market. 
The authors of the previous literature probably had in mind market distortions within 
single jurisdictions. In the present paper, however, we would like to focus on the international   3
dimension. In particular we will consider the case where lower-level authorities such as states 
in  the  US  or  member  countries  in  the  EU  might  interfere  with  the  international  permits 
market. The states’ own objectives in environmental policy might prevent the achievement of 
the federally set standards. 
Nowadays TEP systems are in place for several pollutants at national levels within 
Europe and the US, and a TEP system is currently being implemented for the entire EU for 
greenhouse  gas  emissions.  In  the  US  there  already  exists  a  nation-wide  TEP  system  for 
sulphur-dioxide. For an evaluation of  2 SO  allowance trading program see Schmalensee et al. 
(1998) and Stavins (1998). These federal systems will operate in the way described above, if 
the individual states just pursue profit maximisation on the part of their (polluting) firms. 
Obviously, their objective is much broader, including other welfare aspects such as consumer 
surplus. As is well known, welfare maximization at the state level does not have to coincide 
with  welfare  maximization  at  the  nation-wide  level.  A  state  fails  to  take  account  of  the 
externalities it imposes on the residents of other states, while on the other hand, states are not 
able  to  correct  for  externalities  other  states  are  imposing  upon  their  residents.  The  tax-
competition  literature concludes in such  cases  that  the  federal  government should correct 
inefficient local policies by centralizing the decision power, or by introducing appropriate 
corrective grants  (see Wilson, 1999, for an overview of this literature).  
In the context of a TEP-system states can interfere with the objectives of the federal 
government by setting their own taxes on firms within their own states, or by having their 
own regulations on the trade of permits by companies within the state borders. This can come 
down to imposing trade bans on the sale of permits. Under the latter type of intervention 
states withdraw a certain number of the allocated permits from the market. This has been the 
case in the US, where the state of New York has prevented its electricity companies from 
selling  permits  to  companies  in  Southern  and  Midwestern  States,  by  imposing  fines  on 
utilities making such sales.  
State intervention can be motivated by the desire to extract higher revenues from the 
permits or electricity trade or by the existence of asymmetric transboundary pollution, causing 
so-called hot spots where a disproportionally large part of the pollution is emitted. In the latter 
case the resulting uniform market price for permits does not generally correspond with first-
best.  In  particular,  asymmetric  pollution  spillovers  will  call  for  differing  levels  of 
environmental  quality  and  differing  admissible  levels  of  pollution  across  states.  Such 
requirements for efficiency, however, seem to be impossible to reconcile with a system of a 
laisser-faire TEP system where the final allocation of emission activities is independent of the 
initial allocation of permits. It is known from the literature, see e.g., Tietenberg (2003) and 
Hanley et al. (1997), that with non-uniformly mixing pollutants abatement cost minimization   4
calls for an ambient permit system, where permits refer not to the right to emit but to the right 
to deposit at certain receptor points. However, in practice at federal levels this is not the way 
pollution is dealt with.  
As shown by Santore, Robison and Klein (2001), if asymmetric pollution spillovers 
occur, in a TEP system where states intervene by imposing taxes on the polluting activities 
within their state, the outcome of the TEP market will generally not be permits-constrained 
Pareto efficient, meaning that a central authority can improve welfare in one state without 
decreasing it in another state, given the total number of permits issued. Moreover, given that 
states use their own taxes to steer the decisions of the companies within their own border, it 
follows that whatever the final allocation, cost efficient abatement will only occur if all states 
happen to impose identical tax rates. On the other hand, if a Pareto efficient outcome in the 
presence of asymmetric pollution were to occur, it will not be characterized by cost efficient 
abatement. The intuition for this result is that minimizing pollution abatement costs will in 
general not provide the necessary corrections for asymmetric pollution spillovers.  
The  present  paper  addresses  the  case  where  the  central  government  has  some 
discretion regarding the allocation of permits to states. Therefore, contrary to Santore et al., 
we consider the case where the number of permits and its distribution is not given but where 
they are policy variables for the central government. The main question in this context is then 
under what circumstances a combination of centrally set pollution limits and decentralised 
intervention by means of taxes and/or trade bans on emission activities can lead to a first-best 
solution. The policy relevance of this is obvious. In the design of a TEP system at the federal 
level, the policy followed by the member states should be taken into account. In this sense the 
issue directly  touches  on  crucial aspects  of  fiscal federalism.  In particular, questions like 
which government level should set environmental standards, and which instruments federal 
and lower-level governments have and/or should be allowed to use in order to meet the stated 
objectives  are  at  stake.  When  transboundary  pollution  occurs,  the  “natural  response  is  to 
invoke central intervention of some kind”, Oates (2003, p. 4). But, as he immediately notes, 
uniform  regulations  are  unlikely  to  lead  to  first-best  efficiency.  He  prefers  regional 
cooperation as potentially offering a resolution of jurisdictional spillover effects. What we 
will show, however, is that a TEP-system in a federation where the federal government sets 
the nation-wide pollution level and decides on the distribution of permits, while the states 
decide on the taxes they impose on their local companies, can lead to first-best. The point is 
that, given enough information on state and market behaviour, the federal government can use 
the  initial  distribution  of  permits  as  a  mechanism  to  realise  first-best  production  and 
consumption  values.  Compared  to  the  unrestricted  first-best  total  social  welfare  is 
redistributed among states in this allocation, however. 
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The analysis takes place in a model that resembles the model used by Santore et al., 
but there are two important differences, apart from the endogeneity of the permit distribution. 
We deviate from Santore et al. by assuming that one nation-wide electricity market exists. 
Given such a market, states cannot compensate restraints on the taxes that they can set, by 
inflicting  distortions  in  the  local  electricity  market.  Moreover,  as  in  the  context  of 
transboundary pollution cost-efficient abatement is not an issue anyhow, as we argued above, 
and in order to focus on distributional issues as much as possible, we also abstract from 
abatement. 
The main outcomes of the paper can be sketched as follows. If states impose local 
taxes,  firms’  production  and  polluting  behaviour  will  be  affected  on  the  margin,  and  the 
federal government can employ this knowledge by distributing the permits across states such 
that the first-best allocation of production and pollution is attained. This result will also hold 
if states are not allowed to set negative taxes, i.e., if they cannot give subsidies to their local 
polluting plants. If states use trade bans to affect the emission of pollution in their state, the 
federal government cannot attain the first-best allocation by manipulating the distribution of 
permits. As we show, however, a state government will only have an incentive to withdraw 
permits from use in its state, if it perceives that by doing so, it can affect the nation-wide 
electricity price. In other words, if the states do not have, or do not assume to have market 
power on the electricity market, they will not impose trade bans. 
  In the next section we introduce the model and determine the first-best optimum. 
Section 3 deals with the case where individual states can set pollution taxes on their firms, 
whereas section 4 also allows for trade bans. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The model, first-best optimum and laisser-faire 
 
In this section we present the model and derive the conditions for a first-best optimum. We 
also demonstrate that a standard TEP will not achieve the first-best optimum. 
The  formal  model  reads  as  follows.  There  are  n  ) 1 ( > n   states.  Each  state  i  
produces  electricity,  i y ,  with  a  technology  giving  rise  to  an  aggregate  production  cost 
function  i C  that is continuous, increasing and strictly convex. Interstate trade of electricity 
takes  place  but  no  net  exports  at  the  federal  level  are  allowed.  Production  brings  along 
emissions in a one to one way:  i i y e = . In principle, emissions generated by a state do not 
coincide with depositions in that state, due to the transboundary character of the pollutant. 
Depositions within state i are given by  ) (y di , depending on emissions generated in all states 
( ) ,..., , ( 2 1 n y y y y = ). Agents in each state have preferences defined on the consumption of   6
electricity  ) ( i z , depositions in their own state, and money (capturing all other commodities). 
It  is  assumed  that  consumers  are  identical  within  as  well  as  across  states.  Moreover, 
population  sizes  in  all  states  are  equal.  Social  welfare  in  a  state  is  then  given  by 
) , , ( i i i i d m z W . Here  i m  denotes money holdings, accruing to the state from the net exports 
of electricity minus production costs:  ) ( i i i i i y C pz py m - - = . At no cost one could include 
an exogenous income component. Welfare is decreasing in depositions and increasing in the 
other  arguments.  It  is  additively  separable  in  the  three  arguments 
) ( ) ( ) , , ( y D m z U d m z W i i i i i i i i - + = , where  i U  denotes utility from electricity consumption 
and  i D  is the damage caused by emissions,  
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  federal  government  the  first-best  optimum  is  the 
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Assume an interior solution. Then the following conditions hold 
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where  primes denote the  derivative  in  case  of  a  function with  a  single variable and  ji D  
denotes the partial derivative of  j D  with respect to the  th i -  element (all  i  and  j). The 
interpretation of these conditions is straightforward. They indicate that marginal utility of 
electricity in each state should equal marginal cost, consisting of production costs and the 
costs of emissions, inflicted on all states. In the sequel the values in the first-best optimum 
will be denoted by hats. The system of equations (2.2) and (2.3) yields the optimal amount of 
emissions  for  each  individual  state  i i y e ˆ ˆ =   for  . ,..., 2 , 1 n i =   The  first-best  optimum  will 
therefore be implemented by allocating this amount of permits to each individual state and by 
not allowing trade in permits.  
However, this is not the way a TEP system works. Instead, in a standard TEP system 
the federal government issues tradable permits. As a necessary, but as is shown below by no 
means sufficient, condition to reach the first-best optimum the federal government should 
issue a total amount of permits equal to the first-best optimum amount, denoted by  . ˆ x  The 
beneficiaries are the electricity companies, or the states who distribute them to the electricity 
companies without any restriction on how to use the permits. The electricity companies take 
the  price  t   on  the  federal  permit  market  as  given.  So,  we  assume  that  the  individual 
electricity companies are all price takers. In other words there is perfect competition on the 
product market. This can be justified by the deregulation of this industry, e.g., at the EU level. 
The TEP regime described above will be called laisser-faire. It is well known that it will in 
general not generate the first-best optimum. Consumer demand for electricity is given by 
 
(2.4)  p z U i i = ) (
’  
 
where  p  is the market price for electricity. Electricity supply of a firm confronted with a 
permit price t  follows from the maximisation of its profits  
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Therefore, when taking (2.2) and (2.3) into account one observes that a necessary condition 
for achieving the first-best solution is:  
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1
) ( ) (   for  all 
) ,..., 2 , 1 n j =  condition (2.6) is unlikely to be satisfied in the laisser-faire equilibrium. Since 
the  federal  government  issues  the  first-best  amount  of  permits,  it  follows,  however,  that 
k ˆ = p . This is due to the assumption that emissions are proportional to production with factor 
of  proportionality  equal  to  unity.  This  implies  that  total  emissions  equal  total  electricity 
production,  which  in its  turn equals  aggregate  electricity demand. Hence, the  assumption 
allows for a precise identification of the reason why the first-best optimum is not realised. 
The reason is not a suboptimal level of electricity production but it comes from an inefficient 
allocation of production over the individual electricity companies that do not take the spatial 
aspects of emissions into account.  
 
 
3. Emission taxes by states 
 
In the present section we only consider emission taxes as a policy instrument at the state 
level; trade bans will be discussed in the next section. State i  maximises its social welfare by 
imposing an emission tax denoted  i j  on its electricity firm. For the time being, the tax is not 
bound to be positive, so that it can actually be a subsidy on emissions. The social welfare 
function  of  state  i   consists  of  consumer  surplus  from  electricity  consumption  plus  the 
revenues from the emission tax which are transferred to the consumer in a lump sum fashion, 
the producer surplus from electricity production, including revenues from the sale of permits, 
minus local emission taxes, and, finally, damage caused by emissions. Since emission taxes 
cancel out, the objective of the state is to maximise: 
  
  ) ( ] [ ) ( ) ( y D y x y C py pz z U W i i i i i i i i i i - - + - + - = t  
 
In  maximising  the  welfare  of  its  citizens,  the  state  government  takes  the  behaviour  of 
domestic consumers and firms into account. Profit maximisation on the part of the firms 
yields 
 
(3.1)  i i i y C p j t + + = ) (
’    9
 
from which follows the supply of electricity, depending on the electricity price, the permit 
price plus the state pollution tax:  ) , ( i i p y j t + . Consumer behaviour is described by (2.4), so 
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1 1
) ( ,  where  x  is  the  total  amount  of  permits  issued  by  the  federal 
government, the equilibrium electricity price follows from (2.4) as a function of  x. So, the 
electricity price is a function of the total amounts of permits only and cannot be affected by 
the state. 
If  the  individual  state  took  the  permit  price  as  given,  we  would  be  back  in  the 
previous case of laisser-faire. Instead, it is now assumed that the states play a Nash game 
against each other: each state i takes the emission taxes by all other states  i j ¹  as given, but 
in the optimisation it takes account of the impact its own emission tax has on pollution of 
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1
) , ( j t . As 
the market price of electricity is beyond the control of individual states, the state perceives the 
permits price as a function of state taxes only, i.e.,  ) (j t t = , where  ) ,..., , ( 2 1 n j j j j = . This 
implies that, for a given amount of total permits, we can write  ) (j i i y y =  ( ) ,..., 2 , 1 n i = . In 
the Nash equilibrium we then have  
 

















































for  n i ,..., 2 , 1 = . The leading principle of the planner at the state level is to equalise marginal 
cost and marginal benefits. These are represented in the three terms on the right-hand side of 
(3.2).  An  increase  in  the  local  tax  rate  will  in  first  instance  decrease  production.  Hence, 
revenues decrease but production costs and expenditures on permits decrease as well. Also 
the permits price will change. Given fixed emission taxes set by other states less demand from 
the  home  firm  induces  a  decrease  of  permits  price,  which  is  beneficial  if  i i y x <   and 
detrimental if  i i y x > . Finally, the effect on pollution in the home country as a consequence 
of the reaction of other states has to be taken into account.  
It  is  clear  from  (3.2)  that,  contrary  to  the  standard  TEP  system,  the  equilibrium 
depends on the distribution of the initial allocation, which is a result that is well known in the 
literature (see e.g. Santore et al. (2001)). We can show, however, that with the total number of   10
permits set at the first-best level, a first-best allocation of production and consumption can be 
attained.  In  this  so-called  permits-constrained  first-best  allocation  individual  state  welfare 
need not coincide with first-best welfare, although total social welfare does. 
Proposition 1.  
Given that states set local taxes according to (3.2), the federal government can find an initial 
allocation of permits that generates the permits-constrained first-best allocation.  
Proof. 
A necessary condition for obtaining first-best social welfare is that the federal government 
issues  the  first-best  total  amount  of  permits  x ˆ.  Then  the  market  equilibrium  price  p  
coincides  with  the  first-best  marginal  utility  k ˆ .  Hence  each  state  consumes  the  optimal 
amount  of  electricity.  Next  consider  the  following  set  of  equations: 
å
=
= = + + =
n
i
i i i i x x n i y C p
1
’ ˆ ), ,..., 2 , 1 ( ) ˆ ( t j  and (3.2). This set constitutes  1 2 + n  equations 
and  1 2 + n  unknowns, namely  t ,  ) ,..., 2 , 1 ( n i i = j  and  ) ,..., 2 , 1 ( n i xi = . Therefore, under 
standard regularity conditions, the first-best optimum for production and consumption can be 
realised by a proper initial distribution of tradable permits.e  
 
The  proof  of  the  proposition  does  not  make  use  of  our  assumption  that  emissions  are 
uniformly proportional to production  i i y e =  (for all i ). It also holds in a more general case 
where this assumption is not made.  
Proposition  1  claims  that  the  ‘optimal’  allocation  of  permits  by  the  federal 
government generates first-best total social welfare, but that in the new allocation welfare is 
redistributed across states  compared to the first-best outcome: the new allocation may be 
worse for some individual states and better for some others. The loss or gain for individual 
states  can  be  calculated  by  comparing  the  first-best  welfare  for  individual  states,  i.e., 
) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( y D y C z U i i i i - - , with the maximum welfare under state intervention with an optimal 
permits  allocation,  which  is  given  by  ) ˆ ( ] ˆ ˆ [ ˆ ) ˆ ( ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ) ˆ ( y D y x y C y p z p z U i i i i i i i i - - + - + - t . 
Apparently, state i will gain, compared to the first-best solution if  . 0 ] ˆ ˆ [ ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ > - + - i i i i y x z y p t  
That is, compared to the unrestricted first-best solution a state will gain if it is a net exporter 
of electricity and of permits. In other words, low-cost states and low-polluting states are likely 
to see their welfare improve compared to the first-best allocation 
It is not true that the initial allocation of permits that generates the first-best total 
social  welfare  will  never  contain  negative  allocations.  As  an  illustration  we  consider  the 
following example.  
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Example 1. Initial permit allocations can be negative  
There are three states with identical cost functions: 
2
2
1 ) ( i i i y y C =  ( 3 , 2 , 1 = i ). States 1 and 2 




3 2 1 3 ) , , ( y y y y D b =  with  b  a positive constant. Utility from electricity consumption is 
logarithmic:  ). 3 , 2 , 1 ( ln ) ( = = i z z U i i i   
In  the  first-best  optimum  we  have 
2 2 2 / 1 ˆ ˆ l = = z zi for  all  i ,  where 
). 2 3 /( ) 3 3 (
2 b b l + + = Moreover, 
2 2




2 l = = y y   Notice  that, 
since , 0 > b   , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 3 2 1 y y z z y i = < = < i.e., state 1 should consume more than it produces and 
emits, while for state 2 and 3 the reverse holds. This makes intuitively sense, as state 1 is the 
polluting state. The total number of permits in the first-best optimum follows from  , ˆ 3 ˆ z x =  
and the first-best price is given by  . ˆ / 1 ˆ z p =  
Individual profit maximisation by firms (3.1) gives rise to  ). 3 , 2 , 1 ( = - - = i p y i i j t  
Summing  these  equations  over  the  s yi’ ,  and  taking  into  account  that  å = x yi ˆ ,  leads  to 
x p ˆ ) ( 3
1
3 2 1 3
1 + + + = - j j j t .  As  p   is  given  to  the  state  the  expression  for  t - p  
determines the dependence of t  on  i j  for all i. Inserting the expression for  t - p  back into 








+ + - =
i j
j i i x y j j   which  determines 
j i y j ¶ ¶ /   for  all  i  and  j.  From  state-wise  welfare  optimisation  it  then  follows  that 
1 1 1 ) ( 2 x y y p - = - - t ,  2 2 2 ) ( 2 x y y p - = - - t  and  1 3 3 3 ) ( 2 y x y y p b t - - = - - . Summing 
these equations over  , i x  and using the optimal total number of permits, i.e., å = x xi ˆ , the 
optimal price  p ˆ , and the first-best production values  ), 3 , 2 , 1 ( ˆ = i yi  the equilibrium permit 
price tˆ can be calculated. 
Given  the  electricity  price  and  the  permits  price  in  the  first-best,  the  federal 
government is now able to calculate the number of permits that has to be allocated to each 
state such that first-best production and emission levels are attained. In particular, from the 
separate state welfare maximisation equations we get  ), 1 /( ) 1 ( ˆ 2 ˆ 2 ˆ 3 ˆ 1 1 b l b t + - = + - = p y x  
), 1 /( ) 2 1 ( ˆ 2 ˆ 2 ˆ 3 ˆ 2 2 b l b t + + = + - = p y x   and  l t = + - = ˆ 2 ˆ 2 ˆ 3 ˆ 3 3 p y x   for  state  1,  2  and  3, 
respectively. Obviously, the number of permits to be allocated to state 1 will be negative if 
and only if  . 1 > b  Hence, in that case, the polluting state is forced to buy all the permits it 
needs, but apart from that, it has to pay an ‘entrance fee’ before it can enter the permits 
market. State 2 will get more permits than it needs at the first-best production level. As a 
result, it will sell the permits that are on top of their first-best production levels to state 1.   12
State 3, finally, will get exactly the permits it needs for production, and will, hence, not 
engage into trade on the permits market. e    
In example 1 it is immediately clear that state 2 and 3 gain under the permits-constrained 
first-best, compared to the unrestricted first-best. States 2 and 3 are both exporting electricity, 
while state 2 is also selling permits to state 1. Obviously, compared to the first-best state 1 is 
losing under state intervention as it has to import electricity and has to buy permits.  
  In proposition 1 we did not put any restriction on the state taxes  , 3 , 2 , 1 , = i i j and they 
can therefore be negative in the optimum. The following example demonstrates this. 
 
Example 2. States taxes can be negative in the optimum  
Following up on example 1, we can use individual profit maximisation and first-best values to 
calculate  state  taxes  from  . 3 , 2 , 1 , ˆ ˆ ˆ = - - = i y p i i t j   We  have  ) 1 /( 2
1
1 b lb j + =  
and . 1 3 2 j j j - = =  So, states 2 and 3 subsidise production, while the polluting state 1 taxes 
domestic production. e 
Now suppose that it is politically infeasible for individual states to allow for negative local 
emission taxes, the reason being for example that environmental pressure groups are strongly 
opposed to subsidizing polluting activities. Hence, social welfare maximization by state i is 
subject to the constraint  . 0 ³ i j  Assume that the constraint is binding for one state only, say, 
without loss of generality, for state 1. Returning to the proof of proposition 1, there are again 
1 2 + n  unknowns, namely  t ,  ) ,..., 2 , 1 ( n i i = j  and  ) ,..., 2 , 1 ( n i xi =  and  1 2 + n  equations, 
namely  å
=
= = + + =
n
i
i i i i x x n i y C p
1
’ ˆ ), ,..., 2 , 1 ( ) ˆ ( t j ,  , 0 1 = j  and the set of equations (3.2), 
except for the first one. Hence, in principle we can again solve for the unknowns, and there 
exists  a  permit  allocation  generating  the  permits-constrained  first-best  outcome.  When 
multiple  negative  taxes  occur  in  the  unconstrained  case,  we  can  prove  that  a  permits-
constrained first-best outcome can still be realised  by  an appropriate choice  of the initial 
distribution of permits: 
Proposition  2. In case  of taxes bound to be  nonnegative a permits-constrained first-best 
allocation generally exists. 
Proof. 
From profit maximisation it follows that for all states i whose taxes are constrained to be zero, 
it holds that  ). ˆ (
’
i i y C p = -t  Consider two states, let us say states 1 and 2, with negative state 
taxes  in  the  unconstrained  optimum.  Assume  that  in  the  unconstrained-tax  case 
. 0 1 2 j j > > Then,  if  we  constrain  the  lowest  tax  to  be  zero  in  the  new  equilibrium,  i.e.   13
, 0 1 = j we get that the other tax rate will be positive as  . 0 1 2 = >j j So, only the constraint on 
the lowest negative tax rate is binding in equilibrium. As a result, the first-best optimum for 
production and consumption can again be realised as we have  1 2 + n  unknowns, namely t , 
) ,..., 2 , 1 ( n i i = j   and  ) ,..., 2 , 1 ( n i xi =   and  1 2 + n   equations,  namely 
å
=
= = + + =
n
i
i i i i x x n i y C p
1
’ ˆ ), ,..., 2 , 1 ( ) ˆ ( t j ,  , 0 1 = j  and the set of equations (3.2), except for 
the first one. e 
If a state is forced to impose zero taxes on its firm, the firm can only be incited to produce 
more if more permits are allocated to this state. Obviously, this implies that other states will 
get a lower initial allocation, possibly turning positive permits endowment into negative ones, 
as example 3 demonstrates. 
Example 3. Constrained states taxes can lead to lower permits endowments for other states.   
We saw in examples 1 and 2 that states 2 and 3 imposed negative taxes. If we constrain  2 j to 
be zero the taxes of the other states turn out to be equal to:  ) 1 /( 1 b lb j + = and  . 0 3 = j  The 
optimal allocation of permits now equals  ), 1 /( ) 2 1 ( ˆ1 b l b + - = x ) 1 /( ) 4 1 ( ˆ2 b l b + + = x  and 
), 1 /( ˆ3 b l + = x  respectively. Compared to the allocation presented in example 1, states 1 and 
3 get fewer permits, while state 2 gets more permits. If  , 1 2 1 < <b for state 1 the positive 
permits allocation in the unconstrained tax case would indeed turn into a negative one if taxes 
are constrained to be non-negative.  e 
As a further remark to proposition 1, example 1 also makes clear that in general the allocated 
permits  will  not  equal  the  first-best  emission  levels.  In  a  federation  with  2 > n   states 
,   all for    , i y x i i = will  hold  by  coincidence  only.  Interestingly,  though,  in  a  two-state 
federation, whatever the shape of the asymmetry in emissions, the permits allocated to the 
states  will  always  equal  first-best  emissions,  i.e.,  . ˆ ˆ i i y x =   However,  as  soon  as  a  non-
negativity constraint on state taxes becomes binding, this no longer has to hold. The reason 
for this is that if subsidies to the firms are no longer feasible, subsidized firms will have to be 
incited to produce more by being allocated more permits. We formulate these results in the 
following propositions: 
Proposition 3 
In  the  unconstrained-tax  case  a  two-state  federation  will  have  no  permits  trading  in  the 
permits-constrained first- best.    14
Proof 
It  easy  to  establish  from  profit  maximisation  and  the  permits  constraint  x y y = + 2 1   that 
1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 / / / / j j j j ¶ -¶ = ¶ -¶ = ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ y y y y . After combining the first-best conditions (2.2) 
and (2.3) and equation (3.2) this implies that  . / ) ( / ) ( 2 2 2 1 1 1 j t j t ¶ ¶ - = ¶ ¶ - y x y x  As the 
permits market constraint holds, permits-constrained first-best welfare can only be attained if 
permits are assigned to the two states according to their first-best emissions. In the two-state 
case it is therefore possible for the federal government to completely replicate the first-best 
solution for each state separately. e 
 
Proposition 4 
In the constrained-tax case a two-state federation can have permits trading in the permits-
constrained first-best.  
Proof 
Suppose  two  states  have  identical  cost  functions: 
2
2
1 ) ( i i i y y C g =   ( 2 , 1 = i ).  State  1 




2 1 2 ) , ( y y y D b =   with  b   a  positive  constant.  Utility  from  electricity  consumption  is 
logarithmic:  ). 2 , 1 ( ln ) ( = = i z z U i i i  In the first-best optimum we have  ) /( 1 ˆ ˆ
2 2 2 gl = = z zi for 
2 , 1 = i ,  where  ). 2 /( ) 2 2 (
2 2 bg g b l + + = Moreover,  . ˆ ), /( ˆ ˆ 2 2 1 l b g g = + = y y y   Without  a 
tax constraint, Proposition 1 yields  . ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ 2 2 1 1 y x y x = = From state welfare maximisation we get 
0 1 = j   and  ). 2 /( 2 2 bl gl b j + - =   Inserting  the  constraint  , 0 2 = j   and  calculating  the 
optimal permits allocation, we get that for state 1 the number of initial permits will equal 
) /( ˆ ) ( 2 b g b g + - y   which  is  less  than  the  number  of  permits  state  1  received  in  the 
unconstrained tax case. Obviously state 2 will receive more permits, and so, as the first-best 
production values are unchanged, permits trade will emerge. e 
 
It  is  worthwhile  to  dwell  for  a  moment  on  related  work  by  Santore  et  al.  (2001).  The 
differences in modelling boil down to the following. In their model there is an exogenously 
given  income  level,  and  electricity  production  is  determined  by  the  individual  states. 
Electricity is a non-tradable. Moreover, they do not allow for emission subsidies. We assume 
a nation-wide competitive electricity market. Unlike in the Santore et al. model, in our model 
states are not able to cause distortions in the electricity market, in case the optimal tax rate 
might  not  be  feasible  for  institutional  reasons.  Santore  et  al.  claim  that  for  any  given 
distribution  of  permits,  there  exists  a  Pareto-improving  allocation  of  consumption  and   15
emissions.  This  means  that  with  total  initially  given  exogenous  income,  electricity 
consumption and emissions can be reallocated such that for all states involved welfare is not 
decreased and for one state welfare is increased. The generality of the claim is refuted in our 
model  where  there  exists  a  permit  allocation  that  generates  the  first-best  outcome  for 
production and consumption. The point is simply that in our model we allow the federal 
government  to  take  account  of  states’  behaviour.  By  employing  the  mechanisms  that 
determine the state taxes the government can indirectly steer production values to their first-
best values. So, we conclude that, although they employ a somewhat different model, their 
claim  that  Nash  equilibrium  with  permits  trading  is  generally  not  (permits  constrained) 
Pareto-efficient, only holds with a non-optimal initial distribution of permits. Second, their 
restriction to nonnegative emission taxes creates a distortion that may prevent an optimal 
allocation. In particular when the damage caused by home firms is low, it might be welfare 
improving to subsidise emissions. If states  are prevented from doing this for institutional 
reasons, they have an incentive to opt for inefficiently high production levels. In our model, 
this mechanism is not operative as we assumed (thus far) perfect competition on the product 
market. Moreover, proposition 2 shows that even in cases where tax constraints are binding, 
the federal government will be able to reach first-best production levels by an appropriate 
choice of the initial permits distribution.  
 
 
4. Emission taxes and trade bans  
 
We next consider policy scenarios where states set the emission tax/subsidy and have the 
capacity to impose trade bans. The concept of a trade ban can be interpreted in different ways. 
In the present section trade bans are modelled as a state withholding a certain number of 
permits, that can therefore not be traded by its firm. Another way of representing a ban would 
be  an  additional  constraint  on  the  firm’s  profit  maximization  problem,  prescribing  the 
maximal amount of permits sold on the permits market. The advantage of the first approach is 
that the presence of the trade ban only affects optimal firm behaviour through a change in the 
permits price. It therefore keeps the analysis more tractable. 
It is easy to see that if a state is willing to decrease the total number of permits in the 
market by imposing a positive trade ban, the federal government no longer has instruments to 
reach the first-best total social welfare. The problem here is that, contrary to local taxes, trade 
bans do not affect firm behaviour at the margin, and so by choosing the distribution of permits 
the  federal  government  is  not  able  to  steer  production.  Or,  in  other  words,  the  federal 
government is only able to affect firms’ behaviour via the local taxes. In the case of the co-
existence of local taxes and trade bans, however, local taxes only take care of the internal   16
pollution, while transboundary pollution is corrected by the state by the imposition of the 
trade ban. The trade ban depends on the number of permits allocated to the state. But, if the 
federal government manipulates the allocation of the permits, it affects the permits price (via 
the number of trade bans). A change in the permits price, however, has a uniform effect on all 
states and thus is not suitable to correct the asymmetric pollution effects. 
So, the question that needs to be addressed is under which conditions states will have 
an incentive to impose trade bans, thus making it infeasible to get at a distribution of permits 
that  maximizes  total  social  welfare.  This  appears  to  depend  on  the  states’  capability  to 
manipulate the product price. Thus far, we assumed that states set their taxes in a thin permits 
market and thus, in their tax policy, take account of its consequences for the permits price, but 
consider the product price as given. This might be justified by the observation that the product 
market is typically larger than the permits market, and thus it will be more difficult for states 
to act as a price setter on this market.  
As  we  saw  in  section  3,  if  states  take  the  product  price  as  given,  the  federal 
government  has  just  enough  degrees  of  freedom  to  determine  the  allocation  of  permits 
according to the permits-constrained first-best solution. As we will show below, states will 
then not have an incentive to introduce a trade ban. However, if states are able to calculate the 
relationship between a trade ban and the electricity price, they might impose a trade ban.  
 
Proposition 5 
If the product price is given, states have no incentive to impose trade bans. 
Proof 
Suppose that  states take the product  price  p as  given. Moreover,  assume that the federal 
government has allocated permits according to the permits-constrained allocation described in 
Proposition 1. Given this allocation, and assuming that states have implemented their optimal 
taxes in the absence of trade bans, it will not pay for any state, say state 1, to voluntary take a 
number of its allocated permits out of the market, i.e., will  0 1 > dW  hold for  0 1 < dx . To 
prove this, we consider without loss of generality the marginal welfare change in state 1 after 
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j D D y x y C p  
Inserting this expression for t  into (***) we arrive at 
1 11 1
’
1 1 ) ) ( ( dx D y C p dW - - =  








i D D y C p  Hence, starting from the 
permits-constrained  first-best  (with  a  first-best  allocation  of  production  and  consumption) 
state 1 will not impose a trade ban, when it takes  p as given. e 
 
Proposition 6 
If states have market power on the product market, they might have an incentive to impose 
trade bans. 
Proof 
We prove the proposition in a two-state example by showing that if one state, say state 2, has 
an effect on the product price p a trade ban can be welfare improving for state 2. We specify 
equal production conditions with  2 / ) (
2
i i i y y C g =  for i=1,2, and we assume the utility of 
consumption  to  be  logarithmic,  i.e.,  ). 2 , 1 ( ln ) ( = = i z z U i i i   Moreover,  we  assume 
0 ) , ( 2 1 1 = y y D  and  . 2 / ) , (
2
1 2 1 2 ty y y D =  Thus, only state 1 is polluting, and it is emitting in 
state 2. State 2 considers the introduction of a trade ban, given that in the initial permits-  18
constrained first-best equilibrium, the number of permits it gets corresponds exactly to the 
first-best level according to Example 3. We can calculate the welfare effect of a change in the 
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Notice that in this expression the term  2 / x p ¶ ¶ appears and represents the effect a trade ban by 
state 2 can exert on the electricity price. The optimal tax rate for state 2, evaluated in the 
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State  1  is  assumed  to  know  that  in  the  first-best  ) /( 2 / 1 2 1 x x z p + = =   so  that 
. ) /( 2 /
2
2 1 2 x x x p + - = ¶ ¶   Moreover,  using  the  first-best  solutions 
) 2 / /( ) (
2
2 2 g g g t t y x + + = = and  ), /( ) 2 ( 2 1 t y t x + + = g g we get  0 / 2 2 > dx dW  if and only 
if  , 0
2 < - - t t g  which obviously is true. e 
Proposition 6 thus claims that trade bans can be rational for some states to impose if they are 
able to manipulate the electricity price. Proposition 5, on the other hand, claims that in the 
absence of such market power the permits-constraint first-best can be realised by the federal 
government as states have no incentive to impose a trade ban on their firms.  
 
In Table 1 the effects of imposing a trade ban are illustrated for the two-state case dealt with 
in the proof of proposition 6. We employ two sets of parameter values. In the first set with 
1 . 0 2 1 = =g g   and  , 3 . 0 = t a  trade  ban  starting  from  the  permits-constrained  first-best 
allocation implies a welfare gain for state 2. From the table it appears that this gain is not due 
to correcting the emission spillovers, but due to savings in production costs. The second part 
of  the  table  has  5 . 0 , 1 . 0 2 1 = = g g and  . 3 . 0 = t   In  this  case  state  2  would  not  gain  from 
imposing a trade ban in the permits-constrained first-best allocation, the reason being here 
that production costs are already relatively low. This shows that the possibility for states to 
manipulate the electricity price is only a necessary condition for imposing a trade ban. Notice 
that  if  state  2  is  allocated  ‘too  many’  permits  (i.e.  ) 2 , 1 2 1 = = x x   a  trade  ban  will  be 
advantageous again. Here the disutility of emission from state 2 is decreased, but here too the 
largest gain is in the savings on production costs.   19
 
Table 1: Effects of trade ban*) 
  3 . 0 ; 1 . 0 2 1 = = = t g g   3 . 0 ; 5 . 0 ; 1 . 0 2 1 = = = t g g  
  First-best  Trade ban  First-best  Arbitrary  Trade ban 
State  1  2  1  2  1  2  1  2  1  2 
Permits   1.00   4.00   1.00   3.95   1.67   1.33   1.00   2.00   1.00   1.95 
Production   1.00   4.00   0.99   3.96   1.67   1.33   1.40   1.60   1.38   1.57 
Permits price   3.00   3.00   3.05   3.05   5.00   5.00   3.27   3.27   3.48   3.48 
Electricity price   4.00   4.00   4.04   4.04   6.67   6.67   6.67   6.67   6.78   6.78 
Ln(z)   9.16   9.16   9.06   9.06   4.05   4.05   4.05   4.05   3.89   3.89 
Production costs   0.50   8.00   0.49  7.83   1.39   4.44   0.98   6.40   0.96   6.14 
Value of exports  -6.00   6.00  -5.99   5.99   1.11  -1.11  -0.67   0.67  -0.62   0.62 
State tax   0.00  -3.00  -0.01  -2.97   0.00  -5.00   2.00  -4.60   1.92  -4.53 
Emission disutility    0.00  -1.50   0.00  -1.48   0.00  -4.17   0.00  -2.94   0.00  -2.87 
Welfare  2.66   5.66   2.60   5.72  -5.70  -5.67   1.11  -3.31   0.97  -3.16 





In the present paper we have investigated tradable permit systems in a federal state, where 
pollution  is  transboundary  across  states  and  individual  states  can  conduct  environmental 
policy  by  means  of  emissions  taxation  and  trade  bans  with  regard  to  permits.  The  main 
outcome is that in the design of the initial allocation to individual states, the central authority 
should take the discretionary power of the states into account. In doing so it can set the initial 
permits allocation such that production, consumption and overall social welfare correspond to 
first-best.  However,  if  states  have  an  incentive  to  manipulate  the  product  market  by 
withdrawing some of their allocated permits from the market, the first-best cannot be attained. 
  This  paper  was  motivated  by  the  ‘real-world’  observation  that  in  actual  permits 
markets with asymmetric pollution spillovers such as the  2 SO  market in the US, states 
express a willingness to impose trade bans. As we showed, however, if the electricity market 
is  characterized  by  perfect  competition,  and  states  take,  therefore,  the  electricity  price  as 
given, trade bans will not be imposed and the federal government is able, by a proper initial 
allocation of the permits, to attain the first-best. Obviously, this illustrates that making the 
electricity market more competitive, as currently is being done by the European Commission, 
is crucial for the welfare maximizing characteristics of tradable emission permits markets.   20
It is of interest to notice that the results obtained also apply for TEP markets with 
uniform spillovers. As long as states have an incentive to manipulate the permits market for 
strategic reasons such as getting a trade advantage on the permits market, our results apply. 
Some caution is appropriate as to the actual implementation of the proposed policy. 
The informational burden on the federal government in calculating the optimal distribution is 
sizeable. What is needed is insight into production costs, transportation coefficients, and local 
welfare  weights.  It  would  be  very  interesting  to  study  mechanisms  that  could  reveal  the 
information the federal government needs for her allocation policy in order to approach the 
first-best solution to a satisfactory degree. An additional step in analyzing this issue is to 
introduce information asymmetries between the federal government and the states comprising 
the federation. Another informational burden lies with the individual states that need to know 
their impact on equilibrium prices on the permits market as well as on the product market. All 
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